By: Ahmed kasi
For decades, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been bound together by geography, shared Pashtun heritage, and a turbulent political history. The 2,640-kilometer Durand Line, drawn in 1893, has remained a symbol of mistrust, yet both nations managed an uneasy coexistence. But since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, this delicate balance has collapsed. By December 2025, the relationship has deteriorated into open hostility marked by airstrikes, border clashes, and a dramatic resurgence of terrorism launched from Afghan soil.
At the center of this turmoil stands the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), whose growing presence in Afghanistan has become the single most destabilizing factor in Pakistan’s security landscape. What began as mutual accusations in 2022 has transformed into a cycle of retaliation, diplomatic deadlock, and escalating violence—pushing the region to its most volatile moment since the 1980s.
A Relationship in Freefall
Tensions peaked in October 2025, when Pakistan carried out coordinated airstrikes on TTP hideouts in Kabul, Khost, Jalalabad, and Paktika, targeting senior leaders including Noor Wali Mehsud. The operation followed a deadly TTP assault in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In response, the Taliban fired artillery at several Pakistani border posts, killing 23 Pakistani soldiers. ISPR later confirmed that more than 200 militants and Afghan fighters were killed in the retaliation cycle.
Although a 48-hour ceasefire was brokered in Doha on October 19 by Qatar and Turkey, it collapsed within days. Negotiations held in Istanbul broke down entirely on November 8, as Pakistan demanded written assurances that Afghan soil would not be used for terrorism, demands Kabul dismissed as “violations of sovereignty.”
Matters worsened later in November, when Pakistani strikes in Khost unintentionally killed ten civilians. Taliban officials vowed “appropriate response,” blaming Islamabad for escalating the crisis. At the UN, Denmark’s ambassador warned that around 6,000 TTP fighters were operating freely inside Afghanistan with Taliban facilitation, an alarming confirmation of Pakistan’s long-held concerns.
TTP Safe Havens: Militancy Reinforced
Since 2021, the TTP has entrenched itself across Afghan provinces such as Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, Paktika, and Takhar. UN monitoring reports from February and July 2025 show that the group now runs fully functional training camps with the support of al-Qaeda and elements within the Taliban. These camps, some located in former Haqqani Network strongholds, prepare suicide bombers, train new recruits, and provide logistical hubs for attacks inside Pakistan.
By mid-2025, the TTP was estimated to have 6,000–6,500 active fighters, making it the largest foreign militant group currently operating in Afghanistan. Pakistan has identified at least 58 TTP and BLA camps, many of which relocated deeper into Afghan territory after repeated Pakistani airstrikes killed over 150 militants on Afghan soil.
While the Taliban continues to deny harboring the TTP, UN monitors have documented Taliban-issued weapons, safe houses, and even prison releases that strengthened TTP’s ranks. As analyst Mudassir Khattak noted, “TTP cannot be seen as Pakistan’s internal issue when its entire leadership sits comfortably in Afghanistan.”
Afghan Soil as a Launchpad for Terror
Over the past decade, more than 600 attacks inside Pakistan have been traced back to Afghan-based militants. But 2025 has been the deadliest year yet. TTP attacks in Pakistan surged beyond 2024 levels long before the year ended.
Major incidents include:
- The November 10 suicide bombing at Wana Cadet College, killing students.
- The November 24 attack on Peshawar’s security headquarters, killing three senior officers.
- The January 2025 Hassan Khel clash, in which Pakistan killed 54 infiltrating militants, the deadliest single encounter in years.
Pakistan has responded with precision strikes targeting TTP recruitment sites, bomb-making units, and propaganda centers such as Umar Media. The Taliban, meanwhile, has retaliated with mortar and RPG fire across the border, injuring Pakistani civilians.
Thousands have fled villages along the Durand Line as UNAMA recorded 37 civilian deaths and over 425 injuries from cross-border shelling in 2025 alone.
How Pakistan Is Paying the Price
The fallout for Pakistan has been severe across security, economic, and geopolitical fronts.
Security Crisis:
2025 has become Pakistan’s deadliest year in over a decade, with 1,612 fatalities from 444 attacks, most linked to TTP. Since 2021, more than 5,000 security personnel have been martyred. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan remain the primary battlegrounds, with militants establishing temporary checkpoints and ambush sites that mirror the dark days of the mid-2000s.
Economic Strain:
Repeated border closures have devastated bilateral trade. Imports from Afghanistan, once valued at $1.24 billion, have plummeted. Thousands of trucks remained stranded for weeks, costing traders millions daily. Meanwhile, the repatriation of over 589,000 Afghans has added to Pakistan’s economic burden, while also reportedly adding fighters to TTP ranks as many returnees join militant groups.
Geopolitical Fallout:
With Kabul turning toward India, especially after Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s November 2025 visit to Deoband, Pakistan faces increasing regional isolation. Civil–military tensions at home only complicate matters, diverting attention from critical security reforms. ISPR’s Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry stated bluntly: “The Afghan Taliban must stop helping terror groups using Afghan soil.”
For Pakistan, peace requires verifiable steps from the Taliban: shutting down TTP camps, ending cross-border facilitation, and honoring the Doha Accord’s counter-terror commitments. But Kabul’s current trajectory, denial, defiance, and alignment with rival states, signals that ideology may be outweighing pragmatism.
cover pic credit THE FRIDAY TIMES
