A counter-terrorism strategy is not merely short-term, rather like any other grand strategy, it should be structured into mid-term, and long-term too, very importantly. But one may deeply witness in a counter-terrorism strategy of Pakistan is more or even better to say, almost short-sighted, which can be commented as, ‘Much fast, too unwise’.
Military approach is more short-term, and that must be, as required by the immediate circumstances. Whereas, legislation by civilian government is liable to go for long-term. Unfortunately, the politico-economic instability, the country faces in various forms, sometimes simply blocks better preference of deep-sightedness of the civilian government. So, Government should come up with lasting solution for such instability, to maintain long-term strategy of counter-terrorism prevailing, which is mandatory and a pre-requisite, especially in terms of protracted solution for minimizing terrorism, if not with a permanent one for lifetime.
Unfortunately, Negative competition among institutions of the country is sometimes unconsciously escalated, that clashes a lot, when institutional role is not clearly demarcated.
Four significant ‘Ps’ cannot be fully examined in the ongoing ‘Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ in Pakistan. These are, ‘Prevent’, ‘Prepare’, ‘Protect’, and ‘Pursue’. These essentials in countering terrorism play a vital role to be followed, and each tact depends upon the level of strategy, that institutions give priority on one more than others, proportional to the pure national-interest of sudden needs, and looking forward for upcoming ways at the same time.
NATO’s grand strategy for counter-terrorism is based more on practical steps, which is executed normally after when the radicals are transformed into terrorists by joining organized platform, and very less on ‘Prevention’ of radicals into terrorists.
The core focus of NATO’s Counter-terrorism strategy is Awareness; Coordination among member states through sharing intelligence data, and consultation by strategic assessment and analyses, secondly Capabilities; protecting and preventing threats by responding to it, and the last is Engagement; educating and training of partner states and seeking global actors for combating terrorism.
Pakistan has somehow relevant strategy to ‘NATO’s CT Strategy’, though counter-terrorism by individual state and by alliance greatly differs, because individual state may opt both CT strategies of UN; for long-term, and of NATO; for short-term.
There are substantial elements which are missing in Pakistan’s CT strategy while combating terrorism, and if picked seriously, may bear extra-ordinary outcomes, like ‘Negotiation’, that is missing in ‘CT Strategy’ of NATO; to bargain with international terrorists, as NATO doesn’t feel such need, and that to it, this level may not be necessary to deal with the non-state actors. This argument is true that these organizations have no legitimate authority, nor representative of the people, but it is something else that they are backed by states, which are legitimate, but using illegitimate means to acquire their own political or economic interests.
Prevention is better than cure medically, but also applicable in this regard. Youth mobilization against terrorist activities in the country, and public awareness through various means; most important weapon against terrorist outfits, it is empowering local communities to subdue the evils at their door steps, are steps to non-militarily squeeze this challenge.
In the above-mentioned technique, public involvement is less appreciated, and more undermined because of the trust on capabilities of military-institutions, and of course, that is impossible to do alone without public support. US and France seek to overcome such like threats, by recent use of ‘bubbling populism’.
Use of left-wing politicians, and academia is also more effective, but that may be uncontrolled, and may bear adversarial result. Yet, more open-minds could be utilized with accurate checks.
Counter-terrorism isn’t merely about preventing attacks, rather its main objective is to prevent the harvest of raw material for terrorism, and defining troublesome radicals, actual threat for national security. Incompetently here the definition lacks, and that is what substitutes terrorists, when such extremists with ‘radical-conservative minds’ are recruited by terrorist organizations, that is not initially halted.
Without water; fishes die, without terrorist organization as a platform; terrorists could not be easily nurtured.
Preparation is enhancing the capabilities of relevant institutions, and making them capable to contribute their shares. In fact, combination of different energies, synergic way, is utterly needed to strike the menace of terrorism. There are institutions that need to be worked upon and brought to their main-line, despite putting them in hibernation chamber.
Protection is a team task, and that can be effectively done with strong coordination of counter-terrorism actors, rather just seeking for the leading role. If it is not about grace, and about professionalism, then a team work is a sole master-key to unlock the rusty locks, and that is what the NACTA policy of ‘National Internal Security Apparatus’ (NISA) is structured about, and must be much more active.
Synergy of all the security-relevant institutions, is utmost for combating terrorism creatively and effectively.
Pursuing is about negotiation with the ones, who are ready to surrender, unlike the NATO’s neglection of ‘Negotiation’. Terrorist organizations may vanish or become less-violent, because of joining hands with the government of the state; transforming their interests to that of state-interests to make it similar with the country.
It has to be kept in mind, that such weapon of persuasion differs; insurgents could be given incentives and their legitimate demands could be taken into consideration, that is somehow institutions of Pakistan are trying to be good at, as in case of numerous reported surrendering of Baloch separatists, but if the goal of such evil organization is just to promote fear, instability and pressurizing the state for no valid purpose, then it seems hard to negotiate, rather ‘war on terror’ remains a final option for state to perish and thoroughly disarm them.
In case of sponsored terrorism, there are other offensive means to counter. This complicated phase, it can be said that victory in this stage lies in influencing the terrorists, and force them to be abolished or converted into unlethal form, and coerce the backing states to leave backing.
To know what are the financial sources, and at the same time knowing how to cut that is economically forcing the terrorists to divide and eventually leading to their extinction.
In Afghanistan, ‘Talibans’ are commonly known as ‘Insurgents’ by the moderate analysts, and are the lost-citizens, that must be given space if adjustable. That is why? it opts ‘negotiating-table’, where it serves the interest of their country.
Recently leader of JUI (F), Maulana Fazal ur Rehman has publicly invited Pakistani lost-citizens, involved in so-called ‘religious terrorism’ to join his party for struggling politically to have a pure ‘Islamic system’ in the country. Though JUI (F) stance may not be pragmatic, but a better call to counter-terrorism politically.
‘Separatist Insurgents’ in Balochistan are also invited to drop their guns with the token of numerous incentives, and opt political solution for their ‘sense of deprivation’.
That is more possible, when already siting politicians are given sufficient autonomy to the ‘compromised limit’, by the federal government, and that becomes then an advertisement against ‘taking gun’.
Terrorism in these years, is an international problem, and must be dealt on the same level, as well, where it is more pragmatic.
Pakistan has recently joined Saudi-led forty-two, Muslim majority countries’ alliance of IMAFT, and it is a partner in other Alliances, and partner with states in Counter-terrorism also, but has it benefitted its own country’s interest, that comes within the net of ‘collective benefit’, in such terms? Probably not to a sufficient limit, it must have sought.
