Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Afghanistan

The Geneva Convention was held in 1988 before the USSR collapsed, and citizens of Afghanistan and the governments attached to it hoped for peace in the country and stability in the region. It seemed easier then because of the vanishing Red Army of the Soviet which was fighting its counterfeit cold-war on Afghan soil against the United States proxy of Mujahideen endorsed by Jimmy Carter, and then by the Ronald Reagan administration, with a controversial picture quoting him, “These Gentlemen are the moral equivalents of America’s Founding Fathers” although this was later denied. Whatever the case, the US role in Afghanistan after the Red Revolution of 1979 is not something concealed.

Unfortunately, peace post-Soviet withdrawal has been a wishful dream without any substantial gain in Afghanistan. Data compiled by Johnston’s Archive, Fatalities in Afghanistan, calculates that 1,125,000 people died in Afghanistan during 1979-1989, the era in which the Red Army and the Afghan socialist government were fighting rebellion Mujahideen who were not only backed by US but also its allies.

What could one expect of modern Afghanistan after ten years of the bloodiest war between superpower fighting for global hegemony, and hundreds of warlords left behind to take Kabul, obsessed with their pan-Islamist ideology which had been injected into them?

From 1990 to 2000, there were eight comparatively peaceful years without a civilian casualty, with some exceptions. Both the former Afghan president Dr. Najibullah and the Taliban deserve credit for this. The most fascinating thing is that these were years with least US involvement, years that lacked Soviet presence and years with least hostility for such Islamists.

From 1990 to 2000, there were eight comparatively peaceful years without a civilian casualty, with some exceptions. Both the former Afghan president Dr. Najibullah and the Taliban deserve credit for this. The most fascinating thing is that these were years with least US involvement, years that lacked Soviet presence and years with least hostility for such Islamists.

Since 9/11, fatalities have been increasing and according to the UN, Afghan civilian casualties saw a record high in 2016  with 3,498 civilians killed despite heavily funded foreign military. Why did it fail? This is a question every stake holder in Afghanistan is baffled by. No convincing step has been taken by the US for Afghanistan after their strategy was changed by the former President Barack Obama in 2009, focusing on building the Afghan Army and Police. That strategy will soon be replaced by a new one by the Trump administration.

The new strategy cannot be expected to be very different, but Erik Prince, the founder of Black Water, has been appearing on the US media promoting his idea ‘Restructure’ the Afghanistan War.

The new strategy cannot be expected to be very different, but Erik Prince, the founder of Black Water, has been appearing on the US media promoting his idea ‘Restructure’ the Afghanistan War. This plan purposes to introduce a privatized military solution, aiming to limit the US budget from fifty billion dollars to ten. It also emphasizes on mentoring the Afghan Army at battalion level. Air support and governance support could be under consideration. This would be absurd and will be appreciated neither by the Afghan government nor the US allies, and even the Pentagon. There is more confusion because of little compromise on cooperation and accusation without anticipating the other’s position or realizing each other’s embedded interests.

Thirty-eight years of civil chaos in Afghanistan, and endeavours for peace-building have gained almost no fruit even after the US-led NATO ‘War against Terror’. Neither has terror seen its death nor have we witnessed the victory of ‘Good War’ despite the terrorism killing thousands of civilians across the Durand Line.

Afghanistan’s social problems and their mindset leaning towards the Taliban are the result of the Cold War and its own history that will take some more years to wear off.

If the urban areas have a better situation with strong government control, then why not spread their socio-political culture to the rural areas of the country? It would not be making cities of villages, rather spreading cosmopolitan values to the sub-urban and mountainous village areas under control of the Taliban, inculcating a moderate view of Islam and propagating peace and education.

The question of who should be blamed has led all the stake holders to a perplexity. New Afghan strategy threatens graduated sanctions on Pakistan as a report by the US Defence Department recognizes Pakistan as the most influential external actor affecting Afghan stability and the outcome of both the US and NATO missions. This new approach wants a solution without Afghanistan’s closest Muslim neighbour, having more on-ground experience than even the United States because of proximity and its role in the region.

Pakistan’s envoy in Washington, Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhary, in an interview to Washington Post two months ago and expressed Islamabad’s stance on the upcoming US Strategy in Afghanistan. He insisted that the perception about Pakistan is outdated if Pakistan’s efforts since the last couple of years are sincerely analysed. He further said, “We have reversed the tide of terrorism, which had come down heavy on us.”

On one hand, US withdrawal is essential and on the other, it is more than dangerous. What remains a choice would be for the US to give a signal of not leaving until the negotiation process ends, and convincing them to do so just as the ambassador predicted of a ‘Modest Surge’ of the US in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s counter-terrorism endeavours cannot be undermined but what it needs is strong propagation of its efforts on international forums. It needs to defend the legitimate and sincere efforts of its soldiers targeting terrorist outfits in tribal areas, risking their lives to attain peace.

Pakistan’s counter-terrorism endeavours cannot be undermined but what it needs is strong propagation of its efforts on international forums. It needs to defend the legitimate and sincere efforts of its soldiers targeting terrorist outfits in tribal areas, risking their lives to attain peace.

The image of Pakistan in the Afghan government and public is duller than before and this has been promoted by anti-Pakistan elements. It has worsened Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan without which the latter can never be on a track of minimum Taliban threat.

When Obama introduced the new US strategy for Afghanistan in 2009, the government in Washington had understood that only military solution is not befitting for Afghanistan and hence diplomacy, negotiation, reconciliation, rebuilding Afghan institutions, and soft tactics were adopted. Although this sounded attractive at that time, it has not produced the desired outcomes. Installing a strong government and convincing the citizens of the importance of government and state laws are both essential at the same time.

Border mismanagement between Pakistan and Afghanistan is one of the root causes that provides sanctuary to terrorists operating on both sides of the border. Pakistan is trying to convince Afghanistan to cooperate in this regard time and again and uses it as economic pressure on land-locked Afghanistan whenever ambushes occur in Pakistan and the Afghan soil is being used, per intelligence reports.

What the insurgents in Afghanistan want is the withdrawal of the United States and NATO, as mentioned in the Taliban’s Letter to Trump, urging him to leave Afghanistan and then remove the US-backed government that is democratically elected.

What the insurgents in Afghanistan want is the withdrawal of the United States and NATO, as mentioned in the Taliban’s Letter to Trump, urging him to leave Afghanistan and then remove the US-backed government that is democratically elected. Obama administration was planning for withdrawal which made the Taliban leadership voracious for the government after that and they quickened their activities with hopes to retake Kabul.

Pakistan must not only be sincere in the on-ground operations against terrorists but should also soften its relations with Afghanistan if it wants the situation to be better and dialogue between Afghan and Pakistan governments should never be closed on external commands from either side.

It must be understood that the Afghan government’s providing sanctuary to TTP is never a better means of counter-strategy if installation of peace is the end, nor is reminding of the illegitimate Durand Line controversy as a pressure punch appreciable.

The victory in Afghanistan will neither be the victory of the United States nor of anyone else, but of the Afghan people who will have peace in their country. The clashing interests of Afghanistan, the United States, Pakistan, and other states can never build peace for the citizens of Afghanistan. Despite this reality, the United States should understand the legitimate concerns of Pakistan. It must be understood that the Afghan government’s providing sanctuary to TTP is never a better means of counter-strategy if installation of peace is the end, nor is reminding of the illegitimate Durand Line controversy as a pressure punch appreciable. It merely complicates the ties further.